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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify and discuss the idiosyncratic features of the
adoption and institutionalization of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices.
Design/methodology/approach – This is a conceptual paper in which current theory on the
institutionalization of practices within organizational fields is extended. This is achieved through
considering how well established models of the institutionalization process accommodate the
idiosyncrasies of CSR practices.
Findings – Established models of the institutionalization process do not properly account for the
patterns of CSR adoption that are identified. This is because CSR has some features that differentiates
it from other organizational initiatives, including idealism, delayed discovery of instrumental benefits,
public attention, and the tension between public and private logics.
Research limitations/implications – This is a conceptual paper which now needs to be explored
empirically, either at the level of the CSR practice or at the organizational field. It is believed that a
detailed examination is warranted of the effects of the truncated adoption process (a coercive
bandwagon) on organizations’ adoption of CSR practices. Neither has it been considered whether all
categories of CSR practices are subject to the same dynamics or development path.
Practical implications – It is argued that prizes and regulations that are introduced before the
organizational case has been worked through properly can have a negative effect on the adoption of
beneficial practices throughout the wider field. Similarly, accusations of greenwashing of firms who
implement CSR prematurely, and the negative publicity that results, can result in the valuable ideals of
CSR being operationalised in a sub-optimal form.
Originality/value – The paper offers a new conceptualisation of the path of the institutionalization
of CSR practices.
Keywords Organizations, Corporate social responsibility, Organizational behaviour,
Management culture
Paper type Conceptual paper
1. Introduction
What is actually different about corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices? CSR
has generated an extensive discussion across business-based journals, mainstream
journalism, and corporate literature. This literature (see Lee, 2008 for a comprehensive
historical review) includes investigations and discussions of the nature of CSR,
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normative arguments for and against it as part of good management praxis, and
economic tests of the link between CSR and corporate financial performance (Margolis
and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). More recently, as socially responsible corporate
behaviour has entered the mainstream of management thinking (The Economist, 2008;
Lee, 2008; Lindgreen et al., 2009b), scholars have turned their attention to the question of
what induces managers to pursue it: the cognitive processes at work during the adoption
decision (Basu and Palazzo, 2008) and the institutional environment that frames it
(Campbell, 2006, 2007; Winn and Angell, 2000).
In this paper, we further examine the specific differences between CSR and other
practices, and how they condition those managers’ cognitive processes and that
institutional environment. Specifically, we investigate the importance of certain
characteristics that we infer to be common to all practices labeled as CSR, namely
idealism, moral stance, and a concern for the wellbeing of stakeholders melded to wider
concerns for human rights and sustainability (Garriga and Mele´, 2004). To answer our own
introductory question: this is what is different about CSR practices, and the consequences
are surprisingly far-reaching.
We argue that as a result of this underlying difference, the adoption decisions and
the subsequent institutionalization of CSR practices follow a pattern that differs from
the “normal” one. With most managerial practices, an increasing recognition within a
field of the instrumental benefits is followed by a move towards isomorphic conformity,
where social rather than economic benefits are sought. CSR initiatives typically arise
out of socially embedded concerns, and only later enter an instrumentally motivated
stage of development. The pattern of institutional development is subject to flux and
debate exacerbated by CSR’s high visibility to media and civil society (Bansal, 2005;
Maignan and Ralston, 2002), and by the lack of clear instrumental benefits for the firm.
Institutionalization may be fast tracked by coercive processes exerted by stakeholders
from outside any single organizational field, and yet be retarded or undermined by
ideological conflicts.
We begin by briefly reviewing the literature on CSR and on how organizational
practices are adopted and institutionalized. We then use Tolbert and Zucker’s (1996)
model of institutionalization to analyze the ways in which CSR practices differ from
the norm.
2. Corporate social responsibility
CSR encompasses “the economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic expectations placed
on organization by society at a given point of time” (Carroll and Buchholtz, 2000, p. 35)
and a corporation’s concern for society or for the impact its actions make on society
(Boatright, 2007; de George, 2006). It is a broad concept whose boundaries are conceived
differently by different theorists and adopters (Carroll, 1979; Hill et al., 2003; Snider et al.,
2003; Wilson, 2000). However, there are a number of defining characteristics that can be
ascribed to CSR practices.
The first is an idealistic moral dimension: the decision to adopt necessarily requires
value judgments as to whether it is right or wrong, alongside judgments of its economic
worth or cost. This is reflected in the normative, philosophical debate (Argandon˜a,
1998; Cassel, 2001; Garriga and Mele´, 2004; Jones, 1995; Stoney and Winstanley, 2001)
as to whether ethical considerations or the political position of business in society
confer any responsibility on managers to take account of the interests of stakeholders
Institutionalizing
idealism
367
other than shareholders and hence to focus deliberately on issues beyond and even in
place of profit maximization.
The second characteristic is that economic benefits are tangential to the proclaimed
purpose of the practice, which is instead powered by values that reside in civil society.
Situated in a discourse of public good, interest in the practice is likely to be high and
there is the potential for it to achieve notoriety, driven perhaps by attention from a
knowledgeable, opinionated media (Bansal, 2005).
Linked to these characteristics is the third idiosyncrasy of CSR practices; their
durability in the face of conflicting or unclear evidence for their instrumental benefits.
CSR proponents are able to draw sustenance from outside the organizational field
allowing them to counter demands from within the field for the economic benefits to be
evidenced. Sceptics can be catechized as greedy, rapacious, conformist, or lacking in
vision.
3. Practice adoption and institutionalization
Institutionalization is the process whereby a practice becomes adopted by the majority of
organizations in a field, eventually becoming reified as a social fact which guides
behaviour. Practice adoption and institutionalization are thus closely related phenomena:
within individual organizations, individual managers decide, consciously or tacitly,
whether to adopt or sustain a practice; at the level of the population, or field, of
organizations, such decisions form a pattern which may eventually amount to
institutionalization. The extent to which a practice is institutionalized is observable, at the
level of the organizational field, through the proportion of organizations that have
adopted it. At the level of the organization, it is observable through the extent to which
the adopt/sustain decision is automatic, and determined by taken-for-granted recipes
or paradigms common to all organizations in the field; in some cases, these paradigms
may derive from societal norms.
This process of institutionalization has been examined by a range of theorists
(Dacin et al., 2002; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1987; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996;
Zucker, 1987), who have elaborated upon the mix of instrumental/economic and social
factors that influence whether practices become embedded within organizations and
shared between them. Tolbert and Zucker (1996) identified three stages of
institutionalization: habitualization, objectification, and sedimentation.
Habitualization involves the generation of practices, at the level of the individual
organization, to deal with a given problem or opportunity. The semi-institutional stage
of objectification is where a practice acquires sufficient perceived value, whether
symbolic or economic, for it to spread between organizations through a process of
conscious imitation. At the final stage, sedimentation, practices have spread almost
universally “within the group of actors theorized as potential adopters” (Tolbert and
Zucker, 1996, p. 184). These practices have been sustained for a substantial period and
can thus be regarded as fully institutionalized.
A number of theorists have considered the institutionalization of CSR practices
(Ackerman, 1973; Bansal, 2005; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Christmann, 2004; Clemens and
Douglas, 2005; Gendron et al., 2009; Jennings and Zandbergen, 1995; Lindgreen et al.,
2009a; Moir, 2001; Sharma and Henriques, 2005; Winn and Angell, 2000). We suggest,
however, that none of these writers has identified the implications of the particular
attributes of CSR practices discussed above.
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In the following sections, we examine each of Tolbert and Zucker’s three stages as
they relate to CSR practices. We show how, in the course of this process, the locus of
primary motivation for the adoption of the practice by the firm moves from outside the
organizational field to inside and back out again, and the relative importance of
idealism, economic rationality, and social legitimation varies. We also point out other
important ways in which adoption and institutionalization differ between CSR and
other practices.
Habitualization
In most treatments of institutionalization, early adopters of new practices are driven by
an instrumental desire to improve performance, a rational maximization approach
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). This motivation, which is endogenous to the adopting
organization, contrasts with that of early CSR adopters.
The early adopters of CSR practices typically draw their inspiration and motivation
from outside the firm. These practices can emerge from a wide array of sources within
civil society: philosophical writings, social movements such as environmentalism,
religious conviction, or a personal sense of moral purpose or outrage. Their adoption
during the habitualization phase is, at best, sketchily related to any instrumental
benefits that might accrue and is primarily directed towards realizing public, rather
than private, benefits (Austin et al., 2006; Emerson, 2003, 2006).
CSR practices are not the only ones from which public benefits accrue, and
innovators in many fields outside the realm of CSR have been found to be motivated by
the desire to benefit humankind, as well as the promise of future private wealth (von
Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). However, whether the motivations reside in the creation
of public or private benefits, a typical product or process innovation is designed to
realize instrumental benefits. Though it may, at the outset, be difficult in the beginning
to determine whether they outweigh the cost of implementation. The adopters of a new
quality process, for example, take a leap of faith. However, that leap of faith relates to
when, or whether, private benefits ensue. CSR practices, on the other hand, are adopted
despite, or even because of, the absence of any promise of such benefits; issues of
individual conscience may be of greater importance.
Consider, for example, the case (Kinkead, 1999) of Ray Anderson, CEO of Interface, a
leading manufacturer of carpet tiles, whose production involved heavy consumption of
hydrocarbons and the production of hazardous waste. In 1994, he experienced a
“revelation about what industry was doing to our planet” (Kinkead, 1999, p. 190) and
resolved that Interface would re-conceive its mode of operations so as to become
environmentally sustainable. This led, in the first instance, to a sharp downturn in sales
as Anderson became increasingly involved in environmental crusading. The costs,
meanwhile, remained uncertain.
Lantos (2001) referred to this type of adoption as altruistic CSR; we prefer the term
“idealistic CSR”, since the motivation in question may come as much from the adopter’s
desire to do what is “right” as from any inclination to benefit identifiable others. Thus,
some early adopters of company pension schemes in the UK were motivated by the
wish to avoid the repugnant task of choosing which supplicant retirees were deserving
of a company’s limited largesse (Hannah, 1985). The early adopters of organic farming
were driven by a desire to avoid harming the land, based in part on scientific
observations, but also on a set of distinct values drawn from notions of stewardship
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(Egri, 1997). While there may be some prompting from concerned outside stakeholders,
it is possible that the initial idealists may implement the practice in the teeth of
indifference or opposition from the stakeholders it is intended to benefit. The earliest
UK company pension providers did not have the broad support of workers, who
had established their own schemes for providing for their old age, or trade unions
(Hannah, 1985).
The development of a CSR practice is quite likely to be piecemeal, and undertaken
without support or resources from the organizational field. For example, techniques for
organic farming in the southern Mediterranean countries of Europe were developed by
the farmers themselves, with scientists and researchers becoming involved only in the
1980s. While the company mentioned above, Interface, had to work out for itself how to
make its operations more friendly to the environment, this individualistic approach is a
matter of necessity rather than choice: the moral stance of the founders will stimulate an
evangelical attitude and an openness to share ideas with potential emulators or
converts.
The discovery of instrumental benefits
On the cusp between habitualization and objectification, there typically occurs a
phenomenon that is peculiar to CSR practices, whereby they are discovered to offer
economic or other instrumental benefits not envisaged by their early proponents. These
benefits may take such forms as increased attractiveness to certain customer segments,
the ability to charge premium prices for their differentiated offerings (Gendron et al.,
2009), cost savings (Porter and van de Linde, 1995) and increased ability to attract,
motivate, and retain talented employees (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995).
Thus, Interface found its sales force energized by their firm’s new stance (Kinkead,
1999) and more recently UK supermarkets have discovered both cost savings and sales
improvements from investments in “green” initiatives (Davey, 2009).
This discovery is the prelude to objectification, but it also lays the ground for a
“struggle for the soul of the practice”: conflict between seekers of commercial
opportunity and purists who are unwilling to countenance adoption other than on
idealistic or public benefit grounds (Gendron et al., 2009). Such conflicts are another
singular attribute of CSR practice institutionalization.
Objectification
During the objectification phase, new adopters of a typical organizational practice
remain influenced by instrumental considerations. These include whether it is possible
to make a prior estimation as to a practice’s value and effect; how visible the benefits
are post adoption (Rogers, 2003); and the extent to which considerations of social
contagion and network externalities render its value dependent upon aggregate demand
(Becker, 1991; Kretschmer et al., 1999). These may determine whether managers emulate
practices seen in other organizations in the belief that rivals’ adoption of a practice is
indicative of private information as to its value (Haunschild, 1993; Strang and Macy,
2001). Emulation may arise from the desire to replicate the instrumental benefits of a
practice, while uncertainty as to the true extent of such benefits makes non-mimetic
adoption less likely (Aragoˆn-Correa and Sharma, 2003; Greve, 1998).
However, as practices become more widespread, they become detached from
performance benefits and the locus of the adoption decision becomes increasingly
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exogenous to the organization. Practices then begin to take on a certain legitimacy and
further adoption becomes more structural, unconscious, and based on considerations of
social benefits and a concern for the approval of peers and other bodies outside the firm
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy may
be defined as: “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). It confers personal
and organizational rewards: improved survival prospects for the organization (Baum
and Oliver, 1991, 1992; Singh et al., 1986); enhanced status for its members; and enhanced
access to resources for both (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
Although some theorists (notably DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) have suggested that
legitimation (exogenous) could be expected eventually to outweigh instrumental
considerations (endogenous) as the driving force of adoption, it is unclear to what extent
this change of motivation actually occurs (Kraatz and Moore, 2002; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996;
King and Lenox, 2000). For example, Rivera and de Leon (2004) suggest that the
(instrumental) threat of resource sanctions is a necessary driver of institutionalization, and
that considerations of legitimacy alone are insufficient to influence practice adoption.
A mix of instrumental and social considerations obtains also for CSR practices,
although in that case they represent a shift from exogenous motivations for adoption
towards endogenous, as considerations of profit and competitive advantage play an
increasing role. New and an increasing proportion of continuing adopters move towards
instrumentally motivated CSR or “enlightened self interest” (Moir, 2001; Wilson, 2004).
During this phase, detailed attention is given to the financial pay-offs to CSR
implementation (Winn and Angell, 2000) as well as to its public benefits. Bodies such as
the UK’s Carbon Trust may come into being to promote the business case for a socially
responsible activity.
Only if, and when, the economic or instrumental case for a CSR practice becomes
clearer, it is likely to be more widely adopted. Adopters may be driven by the promise of
cost savings, or the fear of competitors gaining share from ethically motivated
consumers. Recognition of such benefits may be triggered by particular events; the
uptake of organic farming in Europe was assisted by, for example, the discovery of
bovine spongiform encephalopathy in British cattle in 1989 (Lynggaard, 2007). On the
other hand, where the economic effects of a practice are clearly adverse, firms may not
adopt the practice unless forced to do so through legislative or other means. This was
the case with the offering of unleaded gasoline; the legislation to enforce its use in the
USA was strongly resisted by the oil industry, which lobbied and litigated aggressively
against it, delaying its introduction by two years (Lewis, 1985). A more recent example
is the resistance by UK SMEs to the introduction of compulsory maternity and
paternity leave.
Because of the competing logics of the organizational and civil society fields,
relationships between the initial adopter constituency and their newer emulators may
become increasingly emotional as the lack of idealistic motivation in the mass of adopters
becomes plain. Accusations of insincerity, bandwagon-jumping, or “greenwashing” may
emerge as idealists seek to maintain some degree of control and differentiation (Brown,
1994; Lubbers, 2002; Watts, 2006). An example of such accusations is the criticism that has
been leveled at the “industrialization” of organic food production (Clark, 2007; Shea, 2007).
Similarly, Virgin Atlantic’s 2008 test flight using bio-fuels in a Boeing 747 was dismissed
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in some quarters as a “stunt” or “high-level greenwash” (Barkham, 2008; Marotte, 2008;
Williams, 2008).
At this stage, also, coercive factors may come into play, as key stakeholders in civil
society begin to lobby for adoption. These stakeholders include government agencies,
customers, trades unions, as well as lobbyists. Codes of practice and certification schemes
may appear, not all having been worked through or promoted by the organization field,
and compliance with these may increasingly become a condition for doing business, an
example being membership of the Dow Jones Sustainability or FTSE 4 Good indices, even
if their value is questioned (Chatterji and Levine, 2006). As such considerations take hold,
the transition from objectification to sedimentation gathers pace.
Short-circuits to institutionalization: informational and coercive cascades
This transition may be expedited at any point by two phenomena, the informational
cascade, which may occur with any practice, and the coercive cascade, which is peculiar
to the CSR realm. Either of these may result in the objectification stage of the practice
being truncated or even bypassed entirely.
The informational cascade (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Davis and Greve, 1997) is
common to any innovation whose economic value is ambiguous. There is widespread
“bandwagon” adoption of a practice based either on the belief that it will bring benefits,
or fear that other adopters may be reaping advantages that are not yet apparent. These
adoption decisions may be followed by equally widespread abandonment of the
practice, should those benefits turn out to be ephemeral or illusory (Bikhchandani et al.,
1992; Rao et al., 2001; Strang and Macy, 2001).
The common form of informational cascade occurs within a limited organizational
field. It is a distinctive attribute of CSR practices that they have the potential to quickly
gain prominence as an area of broad public interest, driven perhaps by media attention,
pronouncements by legislators, and other political figures, or by a scandal (Bansal,
2005). Bansal found, when examining the adoption of sustainable development practices
by large, well-established, publicly quoted corporations in three capital-intensive
Canadian sectors, that media pressure was a coercive factor at an early stage of the
institutionalization path. The upshot of a sudden surge of attention of this kind may be a
particular form of information cascade that results in widespread adoption of the
practice, perhaps in a bowdlerized form, across a very extensive population of
organizations.
In certain extreme cases, the extent of media involvement and public concern may be
such as to generate what we term a “coercive cascade”, whereby the risks and penalties
pertaining to non-adoption of the practice become so great that some form of adoption,
however formalistic, becomes almost universal. Non-adopters might risk, not just loss
of business, but hostile questioning by shareholders and media, and demonstrations,
picketing or perhaps even violence from members of the public. Firms that succumb to
this pressure, however, risk potentially malign consequences that we discuss below.
Sedimentation
At this point, the path of CSR institutionalization converges with that of normal
practices. When institutionalized, a practice becomes part of the recipe or rules of the
game of the industry (Spender, 1989) or strategic group (Porac et al., 1989). With a CSR
practice, institutionalization may be simultaneous across industries at national,
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regional, or even global level. Perceptions as to its desirability are shared by buyers,
suppliers, and other external constituencies alike (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985).
Significant numbers of customers and influential stakeholders begin to question the
integrity or intelligence of non-adopters; the moral content of CSR practices may be
expected to lend extra sharpness to such questions.
There will be clear and unavoidable economic penalties for non-adoption in terms of
ineligibility for grants and tenders, and perhaps restricted access to loans. Adopters at
this point may well lack any semblance of idealistic enthusiasm for the practice
(King and Lenox, 2000; Rivera and de Leon, 2004), and implement it either defensively
or reactively (Carroll, 1979), with compliance being a matter of upgrading formal
systems to the point where managers can “tick the boxes” when compliance is audited
as has occurred with the current European Commission’s move to legislate food
labeling (Watson, 2008).
The idealistic foundations of CSR practices also have implications for the degree to
which a CSR practice may become institutionalized, due to the constant interplay
between idealistic and instrumental considerations. Because no set of ideals is
universal, even within a homogeneous society, there are likely to be localized pockets of
resistance to the adoption of any given practice, legitimized by alternative ideologies.
In particular, the idealization of free market behaviour (Friedman, 1962; Rand, 1964) can
legitimize reluctant, tardy, or cursory adoption of any practice mandated by the state.
A current UK case relates to food manufacturers’ and retailers’ reaction to pressures
from government and health professionals to label products with their salt, sugar, and
calorie content in an attempt to improve consumers’ health. Some have resisted,
implemented their own alternative systems or presented the information in a way
which some have considered to be misleading (Charter and Elliott, 2006). The resulting
piecemeal and ultimately unsatisfactory outcome of these measures is a danger of the
coercive cascade that forms part of the CSR practice’s journey toward
institutionalization.
This leads to a contrast to the state of play with “normal practices”, where a given
field of organizations can be classified into adopters and non-adopters, with firms
moving from one class to the other with a little overt fuss. With CSR practices, a broad
population of organizations can be classified into enthusiastic, unthinking, and
reluctant adopters, with the latter “dogged rejectors” fired by a degree of idealistic
fervor similar to that we have noted for the former. A move from one camp to another
may become the trigger for internal organizational strife and external comment and
concern. This does not mean that no CSR practice can become fully institutionalized:
HR practices such as pension provision and equal opportunities hiring have arguably
become so across most developed economies, as have recent developments governing
the recycling of manufactured products.
Economic and instrumental factors are likely to play the same crucial role in the
de-institutionalization of the CSR practice (Scott, 2008) as they did in its original
objectification. The ideological debate may simmer for years before the discovery of
unanticipated consequences, and re-evaluation of evidence over the economic case
(Utting, 2000; Pedersen, 2007) results in the widespread abandonment of the practice.
Thus, in the UK, the political consensus that underpinned the institutionalization of
final salary occupational pension schemes disappeared with the advent of the Thatcher
government in 1979, the year that marked the peak in terms of the proportion of
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employees enrolled in such schemes (Wheeler, 2006). However, it was not until the
economic consequences of falling investment returns and increased employee longevity
became clear that the UK firms began en masse to brave trade union antagonism
and withdraw from such commitments, even to existing employees (The Economist,
2003, 2009).
4. Discussion
We return now to the question with which we opened this paper: what is actually
different about CSR practices? In our view, the clearest and most profound difference lies
in the intent of the practitioner – but as we have shown above, that idealistic intent, the
pursuit of public benefits, is observable, in pure form, only in the earliest adopters. The
pre-entrepreneurial period that characterizes the inception of a CSR practice, during
which idealism reigns and instrumental considerations of profit are largely absent, can
be brought to an end in two ways, which are themselves distinctive to the CSR realm.
The first is by the coercive bandwagon that can be engendered because of the high levels
of public attention that the idealistic aspects of a CSR practice can attract. The second is
through the emergence of instrumental benefits, leading to tension between public
and private logics as the practice becomes objectified. These phenomena act in opposite
directions, the first leading to earlier and more widespread institutionalization,
the second inhibiting adoption by some otherwise willing parties. Both, we now
argue, increase the risk that the CSR practice may become institutionalized in a
sub-optimal form.
A practice’s characterization as part of the social good, as well as the role of the
media in focusing on the issues, may trigger a form of coercion beyond the market
forces envisaged by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) when they coined the term “coercive
isomorphism”, although the emotions attached to CSR do indeed make it a potentially
important determinant of buyer power. The coercion here can be more robust and
intrusive: trial by media, consumer boycotts, and antagonistic crowds outside head
offices and retail outlets, as Royal Dutch Shell experienced during its dispute with
Friends of the Earth over the correct way to dispose of defunct drilling platforms
(Boulton and Lascelles, 1995; Nacheman, 1995).
The effects of this truncation of normal adoption decision making are not necessarily
beneficial. A theoretical ideal may be elevated to the status of best practice or regulatory
requirement without it ever having been worked through an organization or wider
society. This means that the stage of experimentation, and the causal identification of
instrumental benefits that occurs at the early stages of other institutional developments,
is skipped with possible negative results. For example, the early consumer and
government preference for hybrid-engined cars may have diverted some manufacturers
away from efforts to develop alternative technologies with potentially even lower
emissions. March (1991) has shown that, within organizations, faster socialization
towards a common set of beliefs may degrade the level of eventual learning and the
development of necessary specialized competences. We suggest that a similar risk
obtains at the aggregated level at which CSR practices are disseminated.
It is thus possible that the rush to institutionalize during an information or coercive
cascade may lead to the second best outcomes in the choice of practice or its
implementation. The current moves by corporations to offset their carbon dioxide
output (Daley, 2007; Gettler, 2007; Moore, 2008; Watts, 2006) appears to have led to
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premature judgments involving misinterpretations of scientific and other evidence,
resulting in extreme cases in measures that achieve neither public nor private benefit.
The hasty adoption of bio-fuels in America and Europe without due regard for the
full environmental and social consequences appears to be another case in point
(Borger and Vidal, 2008; Chakrabortty, 2008; Clout, 2008; Farrow, 2007; Olive, 2008;
Thomson, 2008).
We suggest, moreover, that the formal institutions intended to promote socially
responsible practices in firms, such as governmental regulations or awards, which
would normally emerge at a much later stage in the institutionalization process, may not
achieve their aim. These would include “prizes” such as the Corporate Conscience
Award, awarded by the US-based Council on Economic Priorities, or a place on the FTSE
4 Good index. A focus on obtaining them has the potential to lead to unanticipated
consequences (Merton, 1936), such as distracting firms from focusing on their own
business strategies (Porter and Kramer, 2006), or wasting resources on measures of
esteem that are at best inaccurate and at worst misleading. The Corporate Conscience
Award and the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Climate Protection Award to
Enron (Bradley, 2008) serve as a warning that such prizes may lack accuracy as guides
for external stakeholders.
What we have characterized earlier as the “struggle for the soul” of the practice, in
which idealists criticize, or even demonize, those who seek instrumental rewards from
its implementation, may also have perverse consequences. This phenomenon may not
be avoidable; it has also been observed in the case of practices outside the normal remit
of CSR where idealism is strongly to the fore, such as in the early days of the world wide
web and the open source software movement (The Economist, 2000; Feller and
Fitzgerald, 2002; Stallman, 1999).
However, it too has implications for the degree of learning that can occur in respect of a
given practice. Managers who have been exhorted to implement ideologically driven
practices that have not been demonstrated to generate economic benefits can find
themselves in an uncomfortable position. Their organizations have not yet had the
opportunity to try to identify workable applications of CSR ideals or quantify any
instrumental benefits. However, attempts to experiment and perform necessary
operational refinements risk being labeled as cynical by lobbyists such as http://
stopgreenwashing.org. One interpretation of the Virgin bio-fuels trial mentioned earlier is
as an experimental effort to identify the instrumental benefits of their usage, something
that would actually be necessary for its institutionalization within the organization field.
Such hostile reactions as Virgin experienced impede the adoption of a practice.
These reactions are, however, exacerbated by what appears to be a tendency for
firms, in this experimental context, to exaggerate their prowess. A natural desire to
demonstrate some empathy with public concerns, and perhaps thus derive some early
returns, in the form of enhanced reputation, from investments in untried modes of
operating, may engender a hostile and emotional reaction from wider society. This may
in turn lead to a retrenchment and potential reluctance to implement further CSR
initiatives. Firms that are able to recognize that this stage is experimental and hold
back their communications’ function may encounter less hostile reactions.
We conclude by suggesting two areas for further research. We have identified an
intriguing paradox in which well-meaning attempts to accelerate adoption of a practice
may lead to its institutionalization in an inferior form. A deeper examination of the
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motivations and roles of tardy adopters may be helpful in understanding how and
whether this may be avoided; most case studies of CSR adoption have focused upon the
enthusiasts and early adopters. It would be of particular interest if researchers could
identify whether there are firms that hold back from implementing a practice, and keep
themselves from the public eye, in order to be able to refine it, and could show the
importance of such firms to effective CSR.
Second, research into the effects on managers of criticism of their CSR efforts would
be beneficial. Both the coercive cascade and the fight for the soul of a practice can elicit
strong rhetoric and actions from proponents. Such rhetoric may stimulate greater
efforts to improve implementation, or alternatively may entrench antagonism towards
the practice amongst the more cautious or reluctant adopters, leading to an earlier and
more rapid de-institutionalization if the economic context changes.
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